Medical Device Eligibility for the Statutory Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement by Lanier, Veronica
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 17 | Number 3 Article 6
1-1-1995
Medical Device Eligibility for the Statutory
Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement
Veronica Lanier
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Veronica Lanier, Medical Device Eligibility for the Statutory Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 17 Hastings Comm. &
Ent. L.J. 705 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol17/iss3/6
Medical Device Eligibility for the





I. Background ............................................. 707
A. History of Medical Device Regulation .............. 707
B. Roche v. Bolar ...................................... 710
II. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 ................................ 711
A. Patent Term Extension ...................... 712
B. Experimental Use Exception ....................... 713
III. Judicial Interpretation of the Statutory Experimental
U se Exception ............................ ............. 714
A. Lilly v. M edtronic ................................... 714
B. Baxter v. AVL ............................ 718
IV. Proposed Eligibility Determination for the
Experimental Use Exception ..................... 721
A . Statutory Basis ...................................... 721
B. Judicial Interpretations of Experimental Use
Exception Support Proposed Eligibility
D eterm ination ...................................... 725
1. Lower Courts ................................... 725
2. Supreme Court ................................. 726
a. Analysis of Statutory Framework ........... 726
b. Infant Formula Regulations ................. 729
c. Medical Device Classification ............ 731
C. Public Policy ........................................ 732
1. Comm entators ....................... I .......... 732
2. Congress ........................................ 734
V . Conclusion .............................................. 736
* J.D. candidate 1995, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S.
1968, Chemistry, Florida State University.
Introduction
The federal patent laws grant to an inventor the right of exclusive
manufacture, use, or sale of his patented invention.1 Any unauthor-
ized activities constitute infringement. However, early nineteenth
century courts formulated an exception to patent infringement for
"philosophical experiment[s]," or activities undertaken to "ascertain
the verity and exactness of the specification[s]" of the patented inven-
tion.2 As the common law experimental use doctrine developed, the
infringement inquiry came to focus on the harm to the pecuniary in-
terest of the owner of the patented invention.3 Later courts defined
infringement in terms of the pecuniary gain to the infringer or the
pecuniary loss to the patentee.4
In contrast to the common law, the Patent Act of 19521 codifies
the infringement provision6 but does not recognize any court-created
exception. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 19847 (1984 Act) carves out a limited experimental use excep-
tion for products for which commercial exploitation is delayed by reg-
ulatory requirements imposed by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).s
Although the statutory language of the 1984 Act clearly extends
the experimental use exception to drug products,9 the threshold re-
quirements for the exception leave questions about the eligibility of
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
2. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554,555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391). The common
law experimental use exception was first formulated as dictum in Whittemore v. Cutter, 29
F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
3. Ned A. Israelsen, Making, Using and Selling Without Infringing: An Examination
of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e) and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASs'N Q.J. 457, 460-61 (1989) (quoting 3 W. ROBINSON, THE LAW
OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 55-56 (1890). According to Robinson, while an un-
authorized sale would always infringe, if a patented invention were made or used "as an
experiment ... [or] for the gratification of scientific tests ... the interests of the patentee
are not antagonized.").
4. See Kaz Mfg. Co. v. Cheesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
affd, 317 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding that infringing use requires a benefit at the ex-
pense of the patent owner).
5. Pub. L. No. 66-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 88 1-293
(1988)) [hereinafter 1952 Act].
6. Anyone who "without authority makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, [sic]
within the United States during the term of the patent" infringes the patent. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1988).
7. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598-99 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1988)) [hereinafter 1984 Act].
8. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 88 301-
392 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter FDCA].
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
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other products regulated by the FDCA, such as medical devices. The
Supreme Court, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.," held that medi-
cal devices are eligible for the experimental use exception, but did not
address the application of the exception to particular classes of medi-
cal devices." This distinction is crucial, because eligibility for the ex-
perimental use exception hinges on FDCA regulatory approval
requirements.1 2 While all new drug products must undergo extensive
pre-approval clinical testing, medical devices are subject to varying
premarket requirements under the FDCA.'3 One court's interpreta-
tion of the 1984 Act restricts the experimental use exception to medi-
cal devices subject to the same premarket testing requirements as
drugs.
14
This Note proposes an alternate analysis to determine applicabil-
ity of the experimental use exception to medical devices. The Note
begins by reviewing the history of medical device regulation under the
FDCA. The Note then examines the codification of an experimental
use exception to infringement and analyzes pertinent judicial interpre-
tations of the exception. The author argues that the eligibility inquiry
for a medical device should be based on a case-by-case analysis of the
pre-approval requirements for the particular medical device, and con-
cludes by demonstrating legislative, judicial, and public policy support
for this interpretation of the statutory experimental use exception.
I
Background
A. History of Medical Device Regulation
The 1976 Medical Device Amendments 15 to the FDCA define a
medical device as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant
... or other similar or related article ... intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease . . . [or] intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man.., and which does not
achieve any of its principal intended purposes through chemical ac-
tion within or on the body.1
6
10. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
11. Id. at 673, 678.
12. See discussion of the 1984 Act infra part II.B.
13. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360e and discussion of the history of medical device regula-
tion infra part I.A.
14. Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 798 F. Supp. 612, 620 (C.D. Cal.
1992).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 540 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Amendments].
16. 1976 Amendments, supra note 15, § 3(a)(1).
1995]
Medical devices have been subject to some rudimentary regula-
tion since 1938,17 but not until the passage of the 1976 Amendments
did Congress establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme for medi-
cal devices.' 8 The 1976 Amendments direct the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) to assign each medical device to one of three
categories based on the degree of regulatory oversight the Agency
considers necessary to ensure safety and efficacy. 9 Requirements
necessary to ensure safety and effectiveness are to be determined on a
case-by-case basis by conducting a risk-benefit analysis to assess the
potential reasonable risk of illness or injury.2 °
Under the classification scheme established by the 1976 Amend-
ments, Class I devices2' require only general controls, such as good
manufacturing practices and protection against adulteration and mis-
labeling, to provide sufficient assurance of safety and efficacy.2 2 Class
I controls also require manufacturer and product registration with the
FDA, and impose general recordkeeping and reporting requirements
on the manufacturer of the medical device.23
Under the 1976 Amendments, all Class II medical devices 24 are
regulated by performance standards established by the FDA to assure
safety and effectiveness.25 Performance standards include any re-
17. The 1938 Act extended federal regulatory authority to medical devices, but neither
the 1938 Act nor the 1962 Amendments, requiring medical device manufacturers to
demonstrate both safety and efficacy of their products, contained any provisions for
premarket review and approval of medical devices. Action could be taken against the
manufacturer of a medical device only after the device was commercially marketed and
after it was shown to be misbranded or adulterated. 21 U.S.C. § 360f (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
18. For a history of the 1976 Amendments, see Peter Barton Hutt et al., The Standard
of Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of
1976, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605 (1992).
19. "For purposes of determining which devices intended for human use should be
subject to the requirements of general controls, performance standards, or premarket ap-
proval ... the Secretary shall classify all such devices into ... the classes established." 21
U.S.C. § 360c(b)(1) (1988).
20. Id. § 360c(a).
21. Class I medical devices include such simple instruments as tongue depressors and
thermometers.
22. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A). Class I controls also require registration of the device and
manufacturer, and impose general recordkeeping and reporting requirements on the medi-
cal device manufacturer.
23. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (1978). Even without assurance that general controls are
sufficient, a medical device may be classified as Class I if the device is not part of a life-
support system and does not present a "potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury." 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
24. Examples of Class II medical devices are hearing aids, catheters, and most in vitro
diagnostic instruments, such as x-ray machines.
25. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B). At the time of the litigation between Lilly and Medtronic,
performance standards for medical devices were discretionary with the FDA-even, pre-
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:705
MEDICAL DEVICE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION
quirement FDA considers necessary. For example, there are provi-
sions regarding the "construction, components, ingredients, and
properties" of a device, provisions for testing the device and measur-
ing performance characteristics, and requirements that results of any
mandatory testing actually establish that the device is in compliance
with the applicable performance standard.26 After a performance
standard has been established for a medical device, a device may not
be marketed unless it is in compliance with the requirements of the
performance standard.27 Class II controls can require the submission
of clinical data as part of the premarket notification requirements for
a device.28
Class III medical devices are those devices for which there is in-
sufficient data to establish performance standards or other blanket re-
quirements to assure safety and efficacy, or they are devices used in a
life-support or other critical medical system.29 Class III devices re-
quire clinical investigations involving human subjects3" to establish
their safety and efficacy.31
sumably, upon a determination that they were necessary to ensure safety and efficacy.
When, as of 1987, the FDA had not promulgated a single performance standard for any
medical device, it became clear that the statutory requirement of performance standards
would be unworkable in practice. A 1990 amendment to the FDCA now provides for the
establishment of such "special controls" as the FDA considers necessary to provide "rea-
sonable assurance" of safety and efficacy of a Class II or Class III medical device. The
special controls required of Class II and applicable Class III devices may include perform-
ance standards, patient registries, postmarket surveillance, and FDA guidelines for use. Id.
§ 360c(a)(1)(B).
26. Id. § 360d(a)(2)(B).
27. Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direc-
tion Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 511, 513 (1988).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
30. 21 C.F.R. § 812.3(p), (h) (1994).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (1988). Clinical investigations require an Investigational
Device Exemption (IDE) and Institutional Review Board approval from each institution
at which clinical studies are to be conducted. An IDE exempts the medical device from
requirements such as reporting, registration, and proof of safety while the pre-approval
clinical investigations are being conducted. Although an IDE is generally associated with
the approval requirements for a Class III device, the statute and FDA regulations antici-
pate that any medical device can require an IDE to conduct the studies necessary to estab-
lish safety and efficacy. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) allows the FDA to exempt a device from
registration and reporting requirements (applicable to devices in all classes), performance
standards and special controls (applicable to Class II and Class III devices), and the
premarket approval requirements for Class III devices. FDA regulations promulgated pur-
suant to § 360j apply the IDE requirements to most medical devices introduced after the
passage of the 1976 Amendments. 21 C.F.R. § 812.2 (1980).
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B. Roche v. Bolar
The common-law experimental use doctrine is rarely invoked suc-
cessfully as a defense to infringement,32 although courts disagree on
the breadth of the exception. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, has allowed the experimental use defense only in rare cases
where it finds no commercial purpose-but that court has usually
found some ultimate commercial purpose in any activity by a commer-
cial enterprise. 33 In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals fo-
cused its inquiry on enrichment to the accused infringer.34 This
inquiry allowed for broader application of the experimental use
exception.
Shortly after its creation in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit addressed the issue of interpreting the experimental
use exception. In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. -
a case of first impression-the Federal Circuit adopted the Ninth Cir-
cuit's narrow interpretation. 35 Roche Corporation held the patent on
a drug which Bolar Pharmaceutical imported to conduct the clinical
investigations required for obtaining FDA approval to market a ge-
neric version of Roche's drug.36 When Roche sued for patent in-
fringement, Bolar argued that because its generic drug would not be
introduced until after the expiration of Roche's patent, its activities
were not infringing because there was no pecuniary gain or loss to
either party during the term of the patent.37 Bolar also defended its
activities by arguing that Congress did not intend the approval re-
quirements for heavily regulated products (such as drugs) to effec-
tively grant the patent holder a de facto monopoly past the statutory
17-year term by preventing lower-cost generic alternatives from
32. Israelsen, supra note 3, at 460. See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1019
(1989). Eisenberg would interpret the experimental use exception to allow subsequent use
in basic research. Id. at 1017. Israelsen would allow development and patenting of im-
proved inventions and designing around patented inventions, regardless of commercial
motivation. Israelsen, supra note 3, at 475.
33. See Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1963).
34. Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), affd sub nom.
Dugan v. Lear, 156 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1946) (finding. no infringement where the accused
infringer did not realize a profit from commercial tests of a patented product). The Court
of Claims, predecessor to the Federal Circuit, adopted this more expansive interpretation
of the experimental use defense., Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
35. 572 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
36. Roche, 572 F. Supp. at 256.
37. Id. at 257.
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reaching the market immediately upon the expiration of a patent.38
The district court broadly interpreted the common-law experimental
use exception, finding that "commercial experiments without profit,
manufacture, or sale during the patent term" did not constitute patent
infringement.39
Roche appealed and the Federal Circuit reversed, rejecting both
of Bolar's arguments. First, the court found a patentee's rights vio-
lated by any unauthorized use "solely for business reasons ... con-
ducted with a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to the
experimentor's business."4 The court concluded that the scientific in-
quiry protected by the common-law experimental use exception did
not extend to activities with "definite, cognizable, and not insubstan-
tial commercial purposes."'" Addressing the special circumstances
presented by regulatory requirements, the Federal Circuit declined to
"engage in legislative activity proper only for the Congress ' 42 by carv-
ing out an infringement exception for drug patents. The court's reluc-
tance was attributable in part to several bills that were then pending in
Congress to address the regulatory delay, and to public policy issues
raised by defendant Bolar.43 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit's nar-
row interpretation of the experimental use exception and its refusal to
dabble in judicial lawmaking was significant because it focused con-
gressional attention on the effects of the increasing regulatory de-
mands imposed by the FDCA.
II
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984
Congress combined the two bills to which the Federal Circuit had
deferred in Roche, and enacted them as the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.44 Title I of the 1984 Act
amends the food and drug laws to allow faster marketing of generic
38. Id. At the time, testing and FDA approval of an equivalent for an already estab-
lished drug could require more than two years. Id.
39. Id. at 258.
40. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
41. Id. Notice that the Federal Circuit thereby refocused the inquiry from the deter-
mination of pecuniary gain or loss to the intent of defendant in conducting the activities-
an entirely new interpretation of the common-law experimental use exception. James J.
Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CAm. U. L. REV. 433, 463 (1986).
42. Roche, 733 F.2d at 864.
43. Id. at 865.
44. 1984 Act, supra note 7.
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drugs. 5 Title II contains two amendments to the 1952 Act. The first
amendment adds § 156 to the patent term provision4 6 of the 1952 Act.
This amendment allows the patent holder of a product "subject to a
regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use"' 47 to
obtain an extension of the product's patent term to partially compen-
sate for the regulatory delay in obtaining marketing approval.4 8 The
second amendment contained within the 1984 Act amends 35 U.S.C.
§ 271-the statutory patent infringement provision.
A. Patent Term Extension
Under § 156, only drug products, medical devices, food additives,
or color additives subject to regulation under the FDCA are eligible
for patent term extension.4 9 The regulatory review period that is a
prerequisite for patent term extension is defined for a medical device
as the sum of the testing phase and the approval phase.5 0 Regulations
define the regulatory review period specifically in terms of approval
requirements for a Class III medical device. 51
In addition, the patent term restoration provision of the 1984 Act
imposes various other restrictions on patent term extension: new
animal drugs and veterinary biological products are specifically ex-
cluded;52 the patent holder must pursue FDA approval with due dili-
gence;53 and the patent holder may only recoup one-half of the patent
term lost during the testing phase.54 Finally, the term of the extension
is limited to five years regardless of the length of time actually lost to
the regulatory review period.5
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
47. Id. § 156(a)(4). Section 156(a) also lists several other restrictions not pertinent to,
this discussion. See id. § 156(a).
48. For a more comprehensive treatment of patent term extension in the 1984 Act, see
H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 [hereinafter House Report, part 11, at 37-45;
H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 [hereinafter House Report, part 2], at 21-27.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(1) (1988). Significantly, patented product groups such as cos-
metics and infant formulas are not included despite their regulation under the FDCA.
50. Id. § 156(g)(3).
51. 21 C.F.R. § 60.22(c) (1988).
52. Although in 1988 the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-670, 102 Stat. 3971 (1988), brought these two product types within the
patent term extension provision of § 156.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1).
54. Id. § 156(c)(2).
55. Id. § 156(g)(6)(B).
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B. Experimental Use Exception
The statutory experimental use exception, § 271(e)(1), provides
that "[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a
patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the develop-
ment and submission of information under a Federal law which regu-
lates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs." 6 Unlike the patent term
extension provision, the language of the experimental use exception
does not identify the products eligible for the exception. House Re-
ports from both the Committee on Energy and Commerce57 and the
Committee on the Judiciary58 accompanying the bill mention only an
experimental use exception for drugs.
The Energy and Commerce Committee report explains that the
purpose of § 271(e)(1), the experimental use exception, is "to estab-
lish that experimentation with a patented drug product, when the pur-
pose is to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a
valid patent expires, is not a patent infringement."5 9 The report spe-
cifically addresses the Federal Circuit's holding in Roche which found
such use infringing: "[i]t is the Committee's view that experimental
activity does not have any adverse economic impact on the patent
owner's exclusivity during the life of a patent, but prevention of such
activity would extend the patent owner's exclusivity beyond the patent
expiration date."6 A minority view found Roche "sound law" and
argued against cutting back on patent rights granted by the 1952
Act.
61
The'Judiciary Committee report also discusses § 271(e)(1) only in
terms of drugs. The purpose of the provision, according to the Judici-
ary Committee, is to create a "general exception to the rules of patent
infringement" for a generic manufacturer to conduct clinical tests re-
quired to establish bioequivalency with a pioneering drug.62 "Thus, a
generic manufacturer may obtain a supply of a patented drug product
during the life of the patent and conduct tests using that product if the
purpose of these tests is to submit an application to the FDA for ap-
proval. 63 The report cautions, however, that "the only activity which
will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that the
generic manufacturer can establish bioequivalency of a generic prod-
56. Id. § 271(e)(1).
57. House Report, part 1, supra note 48.
58. House Report, part 2, supra note 48.
59. House Report, part 1, supra note 48, at 45.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id. at 74-75.
62. House Report, part 2, supra note 48, at 5.
63. Id.
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uct." The patent holder would retain the right to exclude others
from the "major commercial marketplace."65 With those restrictions,
the report concludes, "the nature of the interference is de minimis"
and "necessitated by the very nature of the industry involved."66
III
Judicial Interpretation of the Statutory Experimental
Use Exception
Early litigation over the interpretation and application of the stat-
utory experimental use exception focused exclusively on patented
drug products, and the exception was narrowly interpreted.67 More
recently, courts, including the Federal Circuit, have acknowledged
Congressional intent to create a broad exception to patent infringe-
ment. 68 In 1990 the Supreme Court, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., held that the statutory experimental use exception of the 1984
Act extended to medical devices.69
A. Lilly v. Medtronic
Plaintiff Eli Lilly held the patent for an implantable cardiac
defibrillator,7° a Class III medical device. During the term of Lilly's
patent, defendant Medtronic developed and began clinical trials on its
own defibrillator71 which improved on Lilly's technology but was not
independently patentable. When Lilly sued for infringement under
§ 271, Medtronic defended by claiming that its activities were under-
taken to develop and submit information required for premarket ap-
proval of the device under the FDCA, and thus were exempt under
§ 271(e)(1) from a finding of infringement. Lilly countered by arguing
that the plain language of the statute denied the infringement excep-
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 30.
67. Scripps Clinic v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1395-96 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (requiring any manufacture, use, or
sale to be solely for uses related to obtaining FDA approval for a generic product).
68. See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
affd, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Elan Transdermal, Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic
Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (concluding that Scripps misconstrues the exper-
imental use exception).
69. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
70. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1760 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
71. Id. See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(reviewing the history of litigation in the lower court).
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tion to medical devices.72 The district court agreed, finding that
§ 271(e)(1) applied to drug products only.
73
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding the statutory language
"fraught with ambiguity, '74 and based its holding on interpretation of
Congressional intent. The court concluded that "[t]he clear intent of
Congress was to create an FDA experimental use exception for use
which Roche had held would constitute infringement under section
271(a). 75 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the ques-
tion whether 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) protects from infringement those
activities undertaken for the purpose of developing and submitting in-
formation to the FDA to obtain premarket approval for a Class III
medical device.76
The controversy specifically involved the interpretation of the
reference in the statutory exception to "a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. ' 77 Lilly argued that the phrase
referred only to the individual statutory provisions regulating drugs in
a federal law; Medtronic maintained that the phrase referred to the
entirety of any federal law that contained provisions regulating
drugs.78 The Court acknowledged that either interpretation was possi-
ble, but characterized Medtronic's as "preferable," finding that the
passage "more naturally summons up the image of an entire statutory
scheme of regulation. '' 79 On the other hand, the Court acknowledged,
it was also difficult to imagine why Congress would want to open the
experimental use exception to any patented invention regulated by
any federal law that also happened to contain even a single provision
72. Lilly was not without support for its contention. An early commentary on the 1984
Act concluded that "[t]his provision is limited to human drug products, and does not in-
clude medical devices, animal drugs, food additives, color additives, or other related prod-
ucts." Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price'Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 269, 308 (1985).
73. Lilly, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1761. "Nowhere in the legislative history is there any indica-
tion that Congress had a broader intention to include medical devices within the coverage
of § 271(e)(1). Rather, the legislative history evinces the narrow purpose of Congress to
advance the quickened entry of generic drugs onto the market." Id. at 1762.
74. Lilly, 872 F.2d at 405.
75. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
76. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 663-64. Throughout its opinion, however, the Court framed the
dispute as whether § 271(e)(1) exempts the use of patented inventions "to develop and
submit information for marketing approval of medical devices..."-without any reference
to classification. See, e.g., id. at 665.
77. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
78. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 664.
79. Id. at 666. The Court also noted that if Congress intended to exclude medical
devices from infringement protection, "there were available ... infinitely more clear and
simple ways of expressing that intent" than the way that Lilly suggested. Id. at 667.
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regulating drugs.'0 The Court concluded the statutory language was
not "plainly comprehensible" under either party's reading, and that
the legislative history failed to cast any "clear light" on the
controversy.8 '
The Court then focused its inquiry on the intent of Congress in
drafting the patent-related provisions in Title II of the 1984 Act.'
The Court determined that Congress was correcting two unintended
distortions in the patent term for some products subject to regulation
under the FDCA.83 The first distortion would occur when the holder
of a patent was required by law to conduct clinical studies and obtain
regulatory approval before marketing a product containing a patented
invention.84 The approval process could take up a significant part of
the seventeen-year patent term, during which time an inventor would
be unable to derive any profit from the product.85 The second distor-
tion would occur when the patent term was effectively extended by
the regulatory requirement that a generic equivalent of the product
also obtain regulatory approval before marketing.
86
The Court recognized that under Medtronic's interpretation of
the language of § 271(e)(1), there might be "isolated instances" where
the holder of a patent would benefit from the term extension provi-
80. Id. at 668.
81. Id. at 669. For example, Lilly pointed out that House Reports describing the 1984
Act's infringement exception contained no reference to medical devices but mentioned
only drugs. Medtronic responded by pointing to the patent term extension provision
where, even though medical devices are explicitly included in the statutory language, the
legislative history refers almost exclusively to drugs.
82. Id. at 670-73.
83. Id. at 669-70. See also House Report, part 2, supra note 48, for the Judiciary Com-
mittee's recognition of the necessity for correcting particular distortions that had been in-
troduced into the effective patent term of products subject to FDA regulation.
84. Id. at 669-70.
85. Id. at 669. Lilly applied for a patent on its implantable defibrillator in 1967. The
patent issued in 1971, but the device required nine more years of product development
before human clinical investigations started, and another five years before the FDA
granted premarket approval. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ventritex, Inc. at 4, Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (No. 89-243). See also Flannery & Hutt, supra note
72, at 301-02 (concluding from their analysis that the FDA testing and approval process
alone can require seven to thirteen years (after the grant of a 17-year patent)).
86. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 670. Although the 1984 Act provided for an abbreviated ap-
proval process for drugs and allowed clinical studies reported in the literature to be submit-
ted in support of some drug approval applications, there were no corresponding provisions
for new Class III medical devices such as Medtronic's cardiac defibrillator. With a few
narrow exceptions, each Class III medical device was required to duplicate the full FDA
approval process as if it were a pioneering device. Adler, supra note 27, at 513 n.16 ("data
from one pre-market approval [PMA] application cannot be used to support another PMA
without the express consent of the manufacturer") (citing David A. Kessler et al., The
Federal Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 357, 358 (1987)).
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sion without the disadvantage of the exception for competitors, and
perhaps other cases where the opposite would be true. 87 The Court
pointed out, however, that under Lilly's interpretation all patented in-
ventions except drugs (including food and color additives, and medical
devices) would benefit from the patent term extension provision with-
out being subject to the disadvantage (to the patent holder) of the
experimental use exception. 88 The Court found it "most implausible"
that Congress intended to correct both distortions in the patent term
only for drugs, and only to extend the patent term for other groups of
eligible patented products regulated by the FDCA.89
The Court also found indications in the text of the 1984 Act that
§ 156, the patent term restoration provision, and § 271(e)(1), the ex-
perimental use exception, were meant to be "generally" complemen-
tary, and to provide a "product" fit between the two provisions.9 As
an example, the Court pointed to the specific exclusion of new animal
drugs and veterinary biological products from both the patent term
extension and experimental use exception provisions, although both
groups are subject to regulatory approval under the FDCA.91 The
Court found even more convincing evidence of Congressional intent
in a 1988 law that added most new animal drugs and veterinary bio-
logical products to the patent term extension provisions of § 156 and
simultaneously made them eligible for the experimental use exception
of § 271(e)(1). 2
The Court concluded that, despite "legislative imprecision" in
drafting the statutory experimental use exception, Congress intended
to extend eligibility for infringement protection to the same products
that the statute made eligible for patent term extension, and upheld
87. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 671-72.
88. Id. at 672. Lilly's interpretation would have the effect of "positively aggravating
distortion of the 17-year patent protection" for all products except drugs. Id. at 672-73.
89. Id. at 672.
90. Id. at 673-74. The Court actually made this observation to rebut Lilly's assertion
that the two sections were not complementary. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (No. 89-243). Ironically, this textual framework
argument would later become the mainstay of the case for restricting, rather than ex-
panding, the experimental use exception.
91. The Court found this to indicate that "a Federal law regulating drugs" implicated
an "entire regulatory scheme" rather than any specific provisions governing drugs. Lilly,
496 U.S. at 671. Under the latter interpretation, there would be no need for express statu-
tory language specifically excluding those two types of patents, since there were no provi-
sions in the FDCA that simultaneously regulated human drugs and either of the two
specifically excluded groups of products. If, on the other hand, Congress meant the phrase
to refer to any law containing provisions dealing with drugs, then the specific statutory
exclusion would be necessary to clarify legislative intent.
92. Id. at 674. The legislation to which the Court referred is the Generic Animal Drug
and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-670 § la, 102 Stat. 3971, 3984-89 (1988).
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the Federal Circuit's judgment.9 3 The 1984 Act thereby created an
"FDA experimental use exception" to infringement that included
medical devices.94
B. Baxter v. AVL
For several years after Lilly, litigation over the experimental use
exception for medical devices involved Class III devices, to which the
infringement exception unarguably applied. The first litigation over
the application of the experimental use exception of § 271(e)(1) to a
medical device not clearly qualifying for patent term extension in-
volved Baxter Laboratory's study of the feasibility of incorporating
patented technology into a medical diagnostic instrument for con-
ducting blood culture analyses.95
Baxter began conducting preliminary studies to explore the possi-
bility of developing an instrument for determining the presence and
concentration of bacteria in blood using optical sensor technology.9 6
One of the optical sensors Baxter evaluated was patented by AVL,
and AVL sued for patent infringement.97 Baxter moved for summary
judgment, citing the statutory experimental use exception created by
the 1984 Act.98
Baxter argued that its use of the patented sensor technology in an
experimental blood culture instrument was solely to evaluate the fea-
sibility of the instrument as a first step toward generating data to sub-
mit for regulatory approval; therefore, its activities were specifically
exempt from infringement under § 271(e)(1). 9 AVL maintained that
Congress intended the statutory experimental use exception to apply
only to Class III medical devices.1' ° Both parties agreed that the med-
ical device under development by Baxter would eventually be classi-
fied either Class I or Class II by the FDA.''
The district court refused summary judgment on the question of
infringement, following the Lilly court's reasoning that Congress in-
tended for § 156 (patent term extension) and § 271(e)(1) (experimen-
tal use exception) to provide parallel exceptions to the relevant
93. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679.
94. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
95. Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 798 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
96. Id. at 617.
97. Id. at 613. Baxter acknowledged that it was aware of the AVL patent. Id. at 617.
98. Id. at 617.
99. Id. at 619.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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provisions of the patent laws.10 2 Now, under the 1984 Act, patent
term extension eligibility for medical devices extends only to devices
submitted for approval under the specific section of the FDCA detail-
ing the premarket approval requirement for a Class III medical de-
vice.1"3 Considering that statutory restriction, the district court
reasoned that
since only Class III medical devices must endure the requisite 'regu-
latory review period' . . Congress only intended to provide a pat-
ent-term extension for Class III medical devices. Although Class I
or Class II devices may be subject to some limited form of
premarket notification, they are not subject to the 'regulatory re-
view period' necessary for patent-term extension.
10 4
Furthermore, since the plain language of § 156 limits patent term
extension to Class III medical devices, the district court concluded
that only Class III devices would be eligible for the experimental use
exception. 0 5 The court held that manufacture, use, or sale of a pat-
ented invention related to the development of data for FDA approval
of a Class I or II medical device is not protected from infringement
under § 271(e)(1).
10 6
Unfortunately, the Baxter court, while citing the Supreme Court's
finding of complementarity between the patent term extension provi-
sion and the experimental use exception provision, ignored the plain
language of the statutory provisions and misinterpreted the Lilly
Court's application of that language to the eligibility requirements for
the statutory experimental use exception. Moreover, the particular
facts of Baxter raised another question, one overlooked by the district
court: If the experimental use exception is limited to a particular class
of medical devices, how can it be applied before classification of the
medical device itself?
The problem arises because Congress, in the 1976 Amendments,
delegated to the FDA the task of classifying all medical devices in-
tended for human use' ° 7 as well as the task of assigning device classifi-
102. Id. at 618.
103. Id. at 619. The 1984 Act defines the requisite regulatory review period as the sum
of the testing period (the period during which the device is used in clinical investigation on
humans) and the approval period (the time required for FDA approval of the medical
device).
104. Id. at 620.
105. Id.
106. Id. The common-law experimental use exception would still be available to Bax-
ter, of course, but the court found it "highly unlikely that Baxter, a company engaged in
the manufacture and sale of medical devices, was merely gratifying its curiosity or scientific
tastes by undertaking to develop a blood culture instrument." Id.
107. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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cations, either by a finding of substantial equivalence' 018 or by
initiating reclassification of a medical device. 1 9 Limiting § 271(e)(1)
to Class III medical devices, however, would force parties such as
Baxter and AVL to litigate the classification of a medical device along
with the infringement action.
Baxter's development process for a new medical device consisted
of four main stages." 0 First, in a feasibility stage, Baxter would ex-
plore existing technology for possible applications in a medical de-
vice."' Any number of ideas might be pursued and discarded during
this stage." 2 Next came an applied research phase where a particular
technology that had shown promise would be incorporated into a pro-
totype instrument." 3 During the third phase, the approval phase, the
prototype would be used to gather information for submission to the
FDA in pursuit of marketing approval." 4 After FDA approval a med-
ical device would enter the fourth phase of development, the market
introduction phase, where a limited number of devices would be made
for market testing and introduction." 5 The AVL suit was lodged dur-
ing Baxter's feasibility testing of the sensor technology, long before
any prototype development or preparation of premarket notification
submission pursuant to FDA regulations." 6
Baxter would not apply for FDA approval for any medical device
until after the idea had been thoroughly explored in the feasibility
phase, and the new technology was incorporated into a prototype in-
strument during the applied research phase." 7 Any medical device
developed as a result of the feasibility studies and development pro-
cess would not be assigned a device classification until after applica-
tion for FDA approval." 8 Thus, at the feasibility phase, there would
108. Id. § 360c(i).
109. Id. § 360(f)(2)(A).
110. Baxter Diagnostics, 798 F. Supp. at 617.
111. Id. at 617.
112. In fact, Baxter scientists testified that attempts to incorporate AVL's patented sen-




116. Congress clearly intended to provide infringement protection for activities under-
taken during these early stages of product research and development. House Report, part
1, supranote 48, at 45 states that "a party which develops such information, but decides not
to submit an application for approval, is protected as long as the development was done to
determine whether or not an application for approval would be sought."
117. Baxter Diagnostics, 798 F. Supp. at 617.
118. 21 U.S.C. § 360(b) directs FDA to classify all medical devices on the market into
classes established in § 360(a). 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). A manufac-
turer seeking to introduce a new medical device must either convince the FDA that its new
device is substantially similar to a device that the FDA has already classified as Class I or
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be no assignment of a classification upon which protection under
§ 271(e)(1) could be determined. The Baxter court's limitation of the
experimental use exception to Class III medical devices would in ef-
fect require parties to litigate the question of the class to which the
FDA would ultimately assign a medical device-for which an applica-
tion might be years in the future-in order to apply § 271(e)(1).1
9
IV
Proposed Eligibility Determination for the
Experimental Use Exception
The Baxter court misinterpreted medical device eligibility re-
quirements for the experimental use exception. Congress intended el-
igibility for the statutory experimental use exception to be determined
by the submission requirements imposed on a medical device by the
FDCA. This intention is clearly reflected in the 1984 Act, which sets
different eligibility standards for patent term extension and infringe-
ment protection. Eligibility for the statutory experimental use excep-
tion of § 271(e)(1) is to be determined by a case-by-case analysis of
the pre-approval requirements for a particular device. Otherwise in-
fringing uses of a patented invention by a medical device manufac-
turer may be protected if they are related to the development and
submission of information to the FDA as a prerequisite to obtaining
marketing approval of the medical device.
A. Statutory Basis
The 1984 Act distinguishes between the eligibility standards for
patent term extension and for infringement protection. The most ap-
parent distinction between the two standards is in the statutory lan-
guage setting the eligibility requirements for each provision. Section
156 of the patent statute limits eligibility for patent term extension to
only a few of the products regulated by the FDA: medical devices,
drug products, food additives, and color additives.' 20 In addition
§ 156 requires that the product must have been "subject to a regula-
Class II or must undergo the full premarket approval process for a Class III device. See
Mary G. Boguslaski, Classification and Performance Standards Under the 1976 Medical De-
vice Amendments, 40 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 421, 426-27 (1985).
119. It is also possible that a plaintiff would not have a cause of action for infringement
until a device classification order were issued by the FDA, after proper application by the
defendant. If so, this might raise subject matter jurisdiction questions that would preclude
a federal court from considering the claim.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(1)(B) (1988). Food, infant formula, and cosmetics are not in-
cluded. These exclusions actually played prominently in the reasoning by which the Lilly
court distinguished the two exceptions.
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tory review period before its commercial marketing or use.' 121 The
regulatory review period for the application of § 156 is defined rela-
tive to the date that an application was initially submitted for
premarket approval of a Class III medical device.122 Finally, § 156 al-
lows a manufacturer to recoup only half the time spent conducting the
testing required for FDA approval. 123 The plain language of the stat-
ute makes it clear that Congress did not intend to compensate fully a
manufacturer for time spent in seeking FDA marketing approval for a
Class III medical device. 24
On the other hand, § 271(e)(1) provides that activities are not
infringing if they are "reasonably related to the development and sub-
mission of information" to the FDA.125 Here, Congress enacted an
exception to the infringement provision of the patent laws that is lim-
ited only by the reasonable relationship of the otherwise infringing
activities to fulfilling federal regulatory requirements for marketing at
the expiration of the patent term. 26 Congress did not relate the in-
fringement exception either to any specific regulatory review period
or premarket approval requirements. 27 For example, Congress could
have provided an exception for uses reasonably related to obtaining
premarket approval under a Federal law, or could have used parallel
language to indicate eligibility for the patent extension and the in-
fringement exception by creating protection "for uses reasonably re-
lated to fulfilling regulatory review requirements under Section 515
[35 U.S.C. § 360e, setting forth the approval procedure for Class III
devices]."' 28 Congress did neither. It exempted activities reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a
federal law. 29
121. Id. § 156(a)(4).
122. Id. § 156(c)(2).
123. Id. § 156(g)(3)(B).
124. Id. § 156(c)(2). Besides granting only partial compensation for the testing period,
§ 156 caps the length of the patent term extension at five years for any eligible product. Id.
§ 156(g)(b). See also House Report, part 1, supra note 48, at 15; House Report, part 2, supra
note 48, at 6.
125. 21 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
126. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405-06 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Richard
Wolf Med. Instruments Corp. v. Dory, 723 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. I11. 1989).
127. Compare the statutory chain in § 156: The patent term may be extended only for a
medical device for which there is a regulatory review period, which is defined as the period
beginning with human clinical trials and ending with the submission of an application for
FDA approval for a Class III medical device. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(3)(B) (1988).
128. The statutory language of § 156 defines the regulatory review period in terms of
application for approval "under section 515." Id. § 156(g)(3)(B).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
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Further evidence of congressional intent to distinguish the two
provisions can be found in the defeat of a proposed amendment to the
§ 271(e)(1) experimental use exception. 130  The amendment would
have tied the exception directly to patent term extension under § 156,
rather than providing infringement protection for all patents. Accord-
ing to the authors of the amendment, "[a]ny limit on exclusivity [of
manufacture, use, or sale] would only apply to patents whose term had
been extended."'131 Moreover, "the waiver of exclusivity would be ef-
fective only during the last year of the extended term of the pat-
ent.''132 Congress rejected both these restrictions of the experimental
use exception.
It is also arguable that the distinction between Class III and other
classes of medical devices is too artificial to form the basis for settle-
ment of patent-related issues.133 For example, a new Class III device
does not necessarily require the full premarket approval (PMA) pro-
cess before commercial distribution, because a manufacturer may ob-
tain regulatory approval for a medical device by demonstrating that its
device is substantially equivalent to another medical device already on
the market. 34
Furthermore, in the 1976 Amendments, Congress established the
alternative approval process requiring only premarket notification
before commercial distribution of a medical device.'35 Under the
1976 Amendments, a medical device is automatically classified as
Class III unless the manufacturer can show that the medical device is
"substantially equivalent" to a medical device already on the mar-
130. The Moorhead Amendment. See House Report, part 2, supra note 48, at 60-61.
131. House Report, part 2, supra note 48, at 60.
132. Id. Admittedly, the amendment would have narrowed the field of products eligi-
ble for infringement protection beyond even the Baxter court's limitation, but its proposal
and defeat indicate that Congress expressly refused to tie infringement protection directly
to term extension.
133. Medtronic's briefs before the Court pointed this out, arguing that Congress did not
intend for statutes regulating such matters as safety and efficacy to be applied by the courts
and the FDA to determine wholly unrelated issues such as patent protection. Respon-
dent's Brief at 11, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (No. 89-243).
134. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A) (1988).
135. Id. § 360(k). This premarket notification provision is known as the 510(k) require-
ment, after the relevant section of the FDCA. This section requires a manufacturer to
report to the FDA at least 90 days before the date on which he introduces a medical de-
vice: 1) the device classification (established either through a claim of substantial equiva-
lence or through reference to an FDA classification list of all medical devices), and 2)
actions taken to comply with any general controls, performance standards or other require-
ments imposed on the device by its classification. Id.
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ket. 136 A device is substantially equivalent to a predicate device if it
has the same intended use and technological characteristics, 37 or does
not raise different questions of safety and efficacy from the predicate
device. 138 Although there are some statutory limitations on the estab-
lishment of substantial equivalence for Class III medical devices, a sig-
nificant number of Class III devices have been approved under this
provision rather than by the full PMA process.' 39 In 1986, for exam-
ple, manufacturers introduced seventy-two Class III medical devices
through the PMA process and 281 by establishing substantial equiva-
lence with a pre-amendment device.' 40 Although it is likely that a
greater proportion of Class III devices is approved today through the
PMA process, this dual route to marketing approval established by
Congress for Class III devices suggests that the PMA requirement was
not intended to be dispositive on questions as far afield as eligibility
for infringement protection.
On the other hand, if eligibility for infringement protection is in-
terpreted to hinge on the information development and submission
requirements, then the particular route to approval will not be deter-
minative. This is because the substantial equivalence claim is made by
a manufacturer as part of the premarket notification requirement of
21 U.S.C. § 360(k).' 4' Substantial equivalence is determined by the
FDA.
142
136. Id. § 360c(f)(1)(A). The term substantial equivalence means that FDA "by order"
has found that the device meets the statutory requirements for substantial equivalence. Id.
§ 360c(i)(1)(A).
137. Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A). A medical device has different technological characteristics if
there is a significant change in materials, design, energy source, or other features. Id.
§ 360c(i)(1)(B).
138. Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A).
139. Id.
140. Adler, supra note 27, at 515-16.
141. 510(k) submission. The notification requirements are prescribed by FDA regula-
tion. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.92-.93 (1994). Accordingto the FDA, the intent of § 360(k) is to
"enable FDA to determine whether the device is substantially equivalent to one already in
interstate commerce." Alan H.' Kaplan, Through the Maze of 510(k)s, 39 FoOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 160, 161 (1984) (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 42,523 (1977) (preamble to regulations
setting forth notification requirements)).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993). FDA regulations recently promulgated
pursuant to a 1990 law strengthening the regulation of medical devices have expanded
FDA regulatory authority over devices requiring premarket notification. For example, af-
ter review of a premarket notification claiming substantial equivalence with a predicate
medical device, the FDA will 1) issue an order finding substantial equivalence with a predi-
cate medical device, 2) issue an order finding no substantial equivalence to a predicate
device (so that the medical device must be designated Class III), or 3) request additional
information. "Until the applicant receives an order declaring a. device substantially
equivalent, the applicant may not proceed to market the device." 21 C.F.R. § 807.100
(1994).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:705
MEDICAL DEVICE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION
The premarket notification procedure was intended by Congress
to be a pro-forma notification of intent to market a medical device, 43
but it could not be effective until the FDA classified all medical de-
vices on the market and established the general controls and perform-
ance standards mandated by the 1976 Amendments.1'" The FDA,
however, interpreted the premarket notification requirement as a sub-
mission to enable the FDA to make a substantial equivalence determi-
nation.' 45 As a result, the premarket notification procedure came to
resemble a "mini-PMA" process more than a pro-forma notifica-
tion.' 46 The FDA could require the submission of nearly any informa-
tion it felt necessary to make a substantial equivalence determination
(without which, of course, a device could not be marketed). Even if a
manufacturer was seeking to market a device by showing that the de-
vice met established performance standards, the manufacturer still
had to report to the FDA the action taken to comply with the per-
formance standards. In either case, before obtaining FDA marketing
approval, a manufacturer would have to 1) develop information about
the medical device proposed for commercialization; 2) determine that
the device met performance standards or was substantially equivalent
to a predicate device; and 3) report this information to the FDA.
B. Judicial Interpretations of Experimental Use Exception Support
Proposed Eligibility Determination
1. Lower Courts
District courts and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have rec-
ognized that, in contrast to the stringent requirements imposed on eli-
gibility for § 156 patent term extension, Congress enacted § 271(e)(1)
to grant broad infringement protection to manufacturers of products
143. Kaplan, supra note 141, at 162.
144. Id. at 161-62.
145. See supra note 141.
146. Kaplan, supra note 141, at 162. For example, to establish substantial equivalence
for soft contact lenses (a Class I medical device), the FDA requires a manufacturer to be
prepared to
demonstrate substantial equivalence in terms of design; composition; optical
transmission (and homogeneity) and index of refraction; and other physical
properties including oxygen permeability, chemical and physical stability, tensile
and flexural strength; biocompatibility, including bacterial growth; impurities;
leachables; heavy metal levels, preservative uptake and release; and lens care/
cleaning regimen compatibility. [Also required is] a detailed description of the
methods used in, and facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing,
and packing of the device and how such methods, facilities, and controls meet the
requirements of the regulations.
Boguslaski, supra note 118, at 430 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 53,414 (1982)).
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regulated by the FDA. In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,'4 a case
involving an infringement action brought by the manufacturer of a
Class III medical device, the district court interpreted the intent of
Congress as allowing competitors "prior to the expiration of a patent,
to engage in otherwise infringing activities reasonably related to ob-
taining regulatory approval."' 4 The court found that the "primary
concern" of Congress in enacting the experimental use exception to
infringement was "to create a legal environment that would enable
new, medically beneficial, cost-competitive products to reach the gen-
eral marketplace in meaningful volume as soon as the undistorted op-
eration of the patent laws would permit.' 1 49  The district court
concluded that Congress
made a fully self-conscious choice between two directly competing
interests: continuing full protection of the rights of patent holders,
on the one hand, and, on the other, assuring access by the public to
medically beneficial new products at truly competitive market
prices.., immediately after the expiration of the terms of relevant
patents. In essence, Congress elevated the health care interests of
the public above the pecuniary interests of the patent holders.'
50
The Federal Circuit agreed, concluding that Congress intended to cre-
ate a broad exception to infringement, limited only by the reasonable
relation of the activities to producing data for the FDA. 5 '
2. Supreme Court
a. Analysis of Statutory Framework
In Baxter v. AVL 152 the court based its eligibility requirement for
both patent term extension and infringement protection on a strict
reading of § 156, associating eligibility for extension with the FDCA
requirement of premarket approval for Class III medical devices.
However, Baxter reads too much into the Supreme Court's finding of
"textual indications" that the § 156 patent term extension provision
147. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). This case contains a particularly careful and
complete consideration of the history and purpose of the infringement exception in the
1984 Act.
148. Id. at 1273.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1276-77.
151. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Even conducting consumer studies consisting of focus groups, color tests, and interviews
has been found noninfringing under 21 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988), where the purpose was
to "provide information for design of product." Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Personal Prod.
Corp., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20560 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 1993) (unpublished opinion). The
generic manufacturer later designed a medical device 'from data derived from consumer
studies and submitted the device to the FDA for approval.
152. See discussion supra part III.B.
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and § 271(e)(1) infringement exception "are meant generally to be
complementary.' 1 53 The Supreme Court, unlike the Baxter court, rec-
ognized that the complementarity of the statute extended no farther
than "general" types of products (drug products, medical devices,
food additives, and color additives) and not to specific products or
classes of products within a general type.1
54
In Lilly the Court was aware of the 1976 Amendments and the
establishment of medical device classes. In fact, defendant Medtronic
itself drew this to the Court's attention, when Lilly argued that ex-
tending infringement protection to medical devices would seriously
damage a patent holder's market for devices for which there is rela-
tively little demand.'5 5 Medtronic pointed out that CAT-scan devices,
for example, "are Class II devices and normally do not undergo the
type of testing that would enable a competitor to avail itself of the
testing exemption of section 271(e)(1)."'1 56 Medtronic estimated that
"over 90% of medical devices brought to market do not require test-
ing.'1 57 Despite 1) Lilly's argument of pecuniary loss to patent hold-
ers during the term of the patent; 2) Medtronic's speculation that
infringement protection was limited to Class III devices; and 3) the
obvious limitation of patent term extension to Class III devices, the
Supreme Court did not acknowledge, even in dictum, any class dis-
tinction in granting infringement protection to medical devices.
The Court did not disturb the statutory language requiring patent
term extension eligibility to rest on the FDA requirement of
"premarket approval" of Class III devices. It also did not hinge eligi-
bility for infringement exception under § 271(e)(1) on the eligibility
for patent term extension under § 156. In fact, the Court clearly rec-
ognized that patent term extension and infringement protection did
not always go hand-in-hand.'
58
In its argument to restrict the statutory experimental use defense
to drugs, Lilly pointed out that § 156 and § 271(e)(1) were not coex-
153. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 673 (1990).
154. The Court noted that the products eligible for patent term extension, such as medi-
cal devices, food additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs, and human biologi-
cal products, are subject to premarket approval requirements under some provision of the
FDCA, while products excluded from the patent term extension provision are also ex-
cluded from infringement protection. Id. at 674.
155. Some examples of those devices with limited demand are computer-aided tomog-
raphy (CAT) scanning devices and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) instruments.
156. Respondent's Brief at 23 n.29, Ely Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661
(1990) (No. 89-243).
157. Id.
158. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 671-72.
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tensive.159 The noninfringement provision would apply "whether the
patent term is extended or not," and would apply even to "patents
which cannot qualify for a term extension."16 The Court agreed, cit-
ing the example of patented "follow-up" drug products.161 The Fed-
eral Circuit had earlier held such reformulations ineligible for patent
term extension under § 156 because they could be submitted for FDA
approval under an abbreviated approval process.162 Eliminating the
"substantial regulatory delay" at the beginning of the follow-up prod-
uct's patent term would also remove the justification for term exten-
sion under § 156.163 The Supreme Court's agreement with this
reasoning reinforced Lilly's assertion that particular products within a
general product type can qualify for infringement protection under
§ 271(e)(1) without qualifying for patent term extension under § 156.
In fact, the Court recognized that although drug products as a
group qualify for patent term extension, within the general group of
drug products there are specific patented drug products (such as fol-
low-up drug products) that do not qualify for patent term extension
under § 156 but do qualify for infringement protection under
§ 271(e)(1). 161 Consequently, it is highly unlikely that the Court
would point out this distinction for drug products, yet not recognize it
for medical devices, particularly after its holding that medical devices
are eligible for infringement protection.
While the Lilly Court found a "premarket approval requirement"
to be a prerequisite for infringement protection, the Court's use of the
term "premarket approval" suggests that it considered the term to be
associated with an approval process that required the development
and submission of information to the FDA, not strictly with the
premarket requirement for a Class III device. Although § 360e is en-
titled "premarket approval" and sets forth the regulatory review re-
quirements for Class III medical devices, the Court also found that
products not eligible for patent term extension were subject to
159. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, Lilly (No. 89-243).
160. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672 n.4.
161. A follow-up drug patent is a patent for a new dosage of a drug whose active ingre-
dient is already protected under a pioneering patent.
162. Fisons PLC v. Donald J. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
163. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672 n.4. The process is the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) procedure established by Title I of the 1984 Act. Manufacturers of products that
use the same active ingredient as a product that has already been approved are not re-
quired to duplicate the full clinical investigation process that the pioneering product has
undergone.
164. Id. at 673 n.4.
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premarket approval requirements that rendered them eligible for in-
fringement protection.16
5
The Lilly Court decided that products eligible for patent term ex-
tension under § 156 would be eligible for infringement protection
under § 271(e)(1), because they are subject to premarket approval
under some specific provision of the FDCA.166 For medical devices,
the premarket approval requirements of § 360e confer automatic eligi-
bility for infringement protection. The Court found that most other
products subject to regulatory control by the FDCA, such as food 1 6 7
and cosmetics,' 68 were regulated only by "generally applicable stan-
dards" that did not confer infringement protection. 69 A detailed look
at the regulatory requirements for these types of products will distin-
guish the two levels of approval requirements.
There are no statutory premarket submission requirements for
manufacturers or marketers of cosmetics. Although the statute for-
bids marketing of adulterated cosmetics, there are no statutory provi-
sions for premarket certification, nor any pre-approval requirement
that the manufacturer provide assurance against adulteration. 70 Sim-
ilarly, the standards governing food empower the FDA to promulgate
regulations establishing various standards for identity, quality, and
container fill, but again there are no premarket submission require-
ments for manufacturers or marketers of foods. The FDA is not em-
powered by statute to promulgate regulations requiring such
premarket submissions. The regulatory requirements for these types
of products are characterized by the lack of any provision requiring
premarket certification of any of the characteristics or conditions
mandated by statute, or premarket verification of the results of any
testing that might be required under the statute.
b. Infant Formula Regulations
Infant formulas offer the clearest example of both exempting and
non-exempting approval requirements. The 1984 Act subjected infant
formulas only to generally applicable standards' 7' that do not confer
165. Infant formulas are the most striking example. See infra part IV.B.2.b.
166. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 674.
167. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (Supp. V 1993). The Secretary may set standards for identity and
reasonable standards for quality and container fill. Id.
168. Id. § 361 (defining adulteration of cosmetics).
169. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 674 n.6.
170. For example, FDA regulations governing hexachlorophene in cosmetics provide
that "shipments of products ... which are not in compliance with the guidelines.., shall be
the subject of regulatory proceedings." 21 C.F.R. § 250.250(g) (1994) (emphasis added).




infringement protection. In 1986 Congress added new regulatory re-
quirements for infant formulas (1986 Act).172 The Court found these
regulations to constitute premarket approval requirements and confer
automatic eligibility for infringement protection.
173
In addition, the 1984 Act required the FDA to develop nutrient
requirements for infant formulas and to establish good manufacturing
practices, including quality control procedures, to prevent adultera-
tion of the infant formula. 174 The manufacturing practices and quality
control procedures must include the following: requirements for test-
ing each batch of infant formula before distribution; testing of samples
of the infant formula during its shelf life; in-process testing to prevent
adulteration; and internal audits conducted by the manufacturer to
ensure compliance with the good manufacturing practices and quality
control procedures set out by the FDA.' 75 The Lilly Court considered
these requirements insufficient to confer infringement protection
under § 271(e)(1). 176
Significantly, the 1984 Act does not require a manufacturer of
infant formula to verify, before marketing, that the product actually
meets the statutory nutrient requirements, or that processing facilities
actually employ the good manufacturing practices and quality control
procedures established by the FDA. Without any such premarket re-
porting requirement, enforcement of the statute comes only through
FDA inspection of products already on the market or inspection of
production facilities during commercial operation.
Under the 1986 Act a prospective manufacturer of infant formula
is required to register with the FDA the name, place of business, and
each place of manufacture at least ninety days before marketing the
infant formula.177 Before marketing, the manufacturer must also
"make a submission"' 78 to the FDA that includes certain elements:
the formulation of the infant formula; assurances that the formula will
not be marketed until it meets the good manufacturing practices and
quality control procedures imposed by the 1984 Act; and written ver-
ification of test results and records establishing compliance with the
172. In Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4014(a)(7), 100 Stat. 3207-16 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 350a(d) (Supp. V 1993)).
173. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 674.
174. 21 U.S.C. § 350a(a)(2)(A).
175. Id. § 350a(a)(2)(B).
176. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 674 n.6.
177. 21 U.S.C. § 350a(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
178. Id. § 350a(d)(1).
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good manufacturing practices, quality control procedures, and the nu-
trient requirements established earlier by the 1984 Act.'79
Additionally, the Lilly Court found that the registration, product
information, and premarket assurance and verification requirements
established by the 1986 Act automatically conferred § 271(e)(1) in-
fringement protection, regardless of eligibility for patent term restora-
tion. 8 ' The Court's distinction between generally applicable
regulatory standards and premarket approval requirements indicates
that eligibility for infringement protection hinges on the premarket
submission requirement for the particular product.
c. Medical Device Classification
In Lilly the Supreme Court made no direct mention of classes of
medical devices anywhere in its opinion, although it had several op-
portunities to do so. For example, the Court distinguished patents
that would not qualify for patent term extension, even though they
qualified for the infringement exception. The Court proposed that the
two main reasons that a patent wouldn't qualify for term extension
were because 1) the manufacturer did not make proper application for
the extension, and 2) the patent is a follow-on drug patent for a refor-
mulation or dosage change involving the same active ingredient as the
pioneering drug patent.181 If the Court had intended to distinguish
classes of medical devices, it would have been more natural to point
out that medical devices are not eligible for extension if the devices do
not require premarket approval under § 360e.'82 Medical devices
would have provided a direct and timely example of the distinction
between eligibility for patent term extension and infringement protec-
tion because each class of medical device is governed by different stat-
utory provisions.183
First, the Supreme Court could have distinguished Class I and II
medical devices from Class III devices by including them with the
groups of products regulated under the FDCA for which the generally
applicable standards for approval preclude eligibility for the infringe-
179. Id. § 350a(d).
180. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 674.
181. Id. at 673 n.4.
182. The Supreme Court's failure to mention this is all the more indicative of nonre-
strictive intent because the question presented to the Court specifically involved approval
of medical devices under § 360e (regulating Class III medical devices).
183. In addition, most of the follow-on drug products are approved through the ANDA
procedures established in Title I of the 1984 Act. The ANDA process was put in place
specifically to remove the regulatory delays in approval, and therefore obviate the need for
patent term extension. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672 n.4.
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ment exception under § 271(e)(1). Again, the Court did not distin-
guish between classes of medical devices, but instead pointed to foods
and cosmetics, and to the 1984 Act's regulation of infant formulas.
Second, the Court could have distinguished classes of medical de-
vices by narrowing its holding to the call of the question. The ques-
tion presented to the Court was
whether 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) renders activities that would other-
wise constitute patent infringement noninfringing if they are under-
taken for the purpose of developing and submitting to the Food and
Drug Administration information necessary to obtain marketing ap-
proval for a medical device under § 515 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.
184
The Supreme Court rephrased this in a significant way: "The parties
dispute whether this provision exempts from infringement the use of
patented inventions to develop and submit information for marketing
approval of medical devices under the FDCA.'
'1 85
Section 575 of the FDCA codifies the premarket approval re-
quirements for a Class III medical, device. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed a broader question-whether the statutory experimental use
exception protected activities necessary to develop and submit infor-
mation to the FDA. The FDA determines for each type of medical




The Constitution empowers Congress to grant exclusive rights to
patent holders for a limited time.187 At the end of that time, the pub-
lic interest is best served by encouraging immediate competition,
rather than by promoting an indirect extension of patent exclusivity.
1. Commentators
The general debate over patent scope is more complex than a
balancing of property rights against free access to ideas, for it depends
on the best way to achieve the goal of the patent system, which is "[tlo
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 88 Commentators
considering the appropriate breadth of patent scope, including the in-
fringement exception granted in the 1984 Act, have come to diametri-
184. Id. at 663, 664. Section 515 of the FDCA is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360e (Supp. V
1993).
185. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665.
186. See supra note 146.
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
188. Id.
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cally opposite conclusions about its proper application. Wheaton
argues that a broad interpretation of the infringement exception will
discourage innovation189 by reducing the period of market exclusivity
for manufacturers of pioneering products.190 Such a broad interpreta-
tion prevents manufacturers from recouping their research and devel-
opment costs before prices are forced down by competition from
generic manufacturers who have not sustained such large develop-
ment costs.' 91 A broad application of the statutory experimental use
exception in the 1984 Act will introduce uncertainty over future re-
turns on investment and create a disincentive among both pioneering
and generic manufacturers to develop new uses and variations of pat-
ented drug inventions. 192 Others argue for a broad patent scope to
protect the "prospect function" posited to underlie the doctrines and
practices of the patent system. 93 Obtaining a patent, especially if it is
early in a development process or is broad in scope, assures an inven-
tor of the prospect of a return on investment without fear of competi-
tion, and allows more rational and efficient planning for future
innovation. 94
Other commentators reach the opposite conclusion. For exam-
ple, Merges and Nelson argue that diminished competition will de-
crease the incentive to innovate by discouraging a patent holder who
controls a particular segment of a market from exploiting his prospect
as aggressively as if he had competitors. 195 They also argue that tech-
nological advances proceed in different ways for different industries,
so that optimum patent scope depends on the nature of the technol-
ogy in an industry. 96 Biotechnology and medical diagnostics, they
find, are primarily driven by advances in other areas of science.' 97
These "science-based technologies" advance most -rapidly and most
effectively through inventive races to apply new scientific findings,
and in return, a new scientific or technological development yields the
189. Innovation involves putting existing inventions to practical use, Eisenberg, supra
note 32, at 1036, and is distinct from invention. Invention itself is often of no practical
value whatever.
190. Wheaton, supra note 41, at 486.
191. Id.
192. Id. Although Wheaton interprets the infringement exception to apply only to
drugs, his general argument of the interplay between market exclusivity and innovation is
equally applicable to medical devices.
193. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 279 (1977).
194. Id. at 286.
195. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (1990).
196. Id. at 843.
197. Id. at 883 n.188.
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possibility of major advances in the field of medical technology.198
Thus, a broad patent scope may be particularly undesirable in these
industries.199
Another commentator argues for restricting patent scope, espe-
cially through broad application of an experimental use exception,
where the public interest is furthered by promoting scientific pro-
gress.20 0 Eisenberg points to Scripps v. Genentech20 1 as a case where
infringement protection under § 271(e)(1) would have been in the
public interest.20 2 There, a district court found that Scripps' patent for
human clotting factor was infringed by Genentech's production of the
factor using recombinant DNA technology, a significant scientific
achievement. 20 3 Genentech's method would have made human clot-
ting factor more economical and safe, but a court held that Scripps'
broad patent rights prevented it.2°4 Without a broad experimental use
exception, Eisenberg concludes,
One can only speculate as to how much longer the public would
have to wait for this and other improvements if patent holders could
block their rivals from competing with them in research. Given that
patent holders have an interest in prolonging the period of the pub-
lic's dependence on patented technologies and the difficulty of fore-
seeing the outcome of future research projects in the fields of
patented inventions, it seems imprudent to place this power in the
hands of patent holders.20 5
2. Congress
Congress agreed that a broad application of the experimental use
exception is desirable. The House Report accompanying the 1984 Act
pointed out that infringement protection under § 271(e)(1) will sub-
stantially benefit the government and the public. 20 6 The public, espe-
cially the poor, the under-insured, and the elderly, will benefit from
the reduction in health care costs brought about by faster approval
and marketing of generic substitutes for patented medical devices.20 7
198. Id. at 883-84.
199. Id. at 884.
200. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1081.
201. Scripps Clinic v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
202. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1083.
203. Id. at 1082. Producing human clotting factor through recombinant technology
"would obviate the need for a large donor pool and eliminate the risk of transmitting
infectious agents from donors." Scripps, 666 F. Supp. at 1384.
204. The ruling was later overturned on other grounds, with the Federal Circuit re-
jecting the district court's interpretation of the statutory experimental use exception. Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 403 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
205. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1083.
206. House Report, part 2, supra note 48, at 29.
207. Id.
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The government itself, as purchaser of health products for various
public programs, will also save money.208 Against the interests of the
public and the government, the claims of pioneering product interests
are, according to Congress, "much less tangible. '20 9 However, Con-
gress acknowledged "the nature of the industry" mandates the crea-
tion of broad exceptions to the normal operation of the patent laws
for products that are both heavily regulated and particularly impor-
tant to public health.210
Furthermore, there are significant public benefits in access to im-
provements in medical device technology. Restricting infringement
protection to developers of Class III medical devices would eliminate
protection for ninety-seven percent of medical devices.211 Some of
those devices left without protection would include diagnostic devices
such as tissue imaging systems 212 and microsurgical lasers. 21 3 These
devices are being swept along by rapid advances in other technical
areas like miniaturized electronic circuitry, advanced power sources,
and image collection systems. Medical devices that stand to offer the
greatest benefit to the public are not necessarily Class III devices,
which are by definition life-saving or life-sustaining products,214 but
which might only have a very limited market. A Class I or Class II
medical device can offer greater potential for significant impact on the
quality of health care because one device may be used for the diagno-
sis or treatment of many people with different illnesses. As a result,
the policy argument is compelling against categorical exclusion of




210. Id. at 30.
211. In 1985 approximately 35% of the medical devices on the market were Class I,
62% were Class II, and 3% Class III. Boguslaski, supra note 118, at 426. By 1988 there
were over 41,000 medical devices on the market, produced in over 7000 establishments.
Adler, supra note 27, at 511.
212. Classified Class II in 21 C.F.R. § 84.2225 (1994).
213. Classified Class II in 21 C.F.R. § 74.4490 (1994).
214. A Class III device is one that "is purported or represented to be for a use in sup-
porting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in prevent-
ing impairment of human health." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
215. See supra notes 147-51, and accompanying text for a discussion of the Intermedics






The plain language of § 271(e)(1) extends infringement protec-
tion to activities reasonably related to the "development and submis-
sion of information" to the FDA. The statute, and FDA regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, require the development and submis-
sion of information for most medical devices as a prerequisite for
FDA marketing approval or as part of a premarket notification sub-
mission. Consequently, the Baxter holding limiting infringement pro-
tection to medical devices that are also eligible for patent term
extension (that is, to Class III medical devices) is incorrect.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Lilly v. Medtronic distinguished
the eligibility for patent term extension from the eligibility for in-
fringement protection. Further, the Court recognized that a product
might qualify for infringement protection without qualifying for pat-
ent term extension.
Therefore, the application of the statutory experimental use ex-
ception should involve an examination of the particular activities and
medical devices involved in each case. Congress intended, by the
plain language of § 271(e)(1), to base the infringement exception on
whether the activities at issue were conducted to develop and submit
information to the FDA to fulfill regulatory approval requirements.
This individual inquiry best serves the public interest by neither en-
larging nor restricting the proper application of the exception. More
important, restricting infringement protection to manufacturers of
Class III medical devices is not in the public interest because it will
deny the public lower-cost health products and advances in medical
device technology.
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